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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
It has long been a source of consternation among economists as to why there
has been considerably less capital ow from the capital rich industrialised
economies to the capital poor developing economies [see Robert E. Lucas Jr.
(1990)]. Some economists have used di¤erences in fundamentals (production
structure, technology, policies, institutions) as explanations for the paradox.
For example, Lucas cites the di¤erences in human capital as the key reason
why capital does not move to the South. On the other hand, other economists
have mainly relied on capital market failures (expropriation risks, sovereign
risks, asymmetric information) to resolve the paradox1.
Nevertheless, it is also clear from empirical research that it is often di¢ cult
to distinguish one theory from another. Countries with weak institutions tend
to have lower human capital, and weak institutions tend to be associated with
greater information asymmetry and expropriation risks. There can be too
much or too little capital to the South, depending on which benchmark model
is used, what instruments are used, what is dened as capital, and what kind
of growth accounting is used2.
Notwithstanding the various arguments presented, development over the
past decade has necessitated a new understanding of the Lucas Paradox. The
opening of China, India and other major emerging economies has resulted in
increased ow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to what is loosely termed as
the South. The ow of capital is however highly uneven [see Stephany Gri¢ th-
Jones and Jonathan Leape (2002)]. China attracted a fth of all private capital
ows to developing countries in the 1990s, peaking at $60 billion in 1997.
Indias share has been paltry by contrast, with a peak of $7 billion only in
1994. The latest gures show that China took in $72 billion in FDI in 2005,
while India only received $6.6 billion3.
If the Lucas paradox exists for India, it is on the face of it much less of a
1See Alfaro et al (2005) for a brief discussion on the various competing hypotheses.
2Francesco Caselli and James Feyrer (2007) o¤er a similar insight by making a distinction
between reproducible and non-reproducible capital. The authors argue that the reward to
reproducible capital is in fact rather low in the South once proper accounting is done. There
is therefore no paradox that capital does not move there.
3Chinas cumulative inward FDI stands at $318 billion compared to $45 billion for India
(UNCTAD). The di¤erence in the levels of FDI is not due to di¤erences in domestic invest-
ment. Inward FDI made up 11.3 per cent of Chinas gross capital formation between 1990
and 2000, but only 1.9 per cent compared to India. One of the explanations for the big
di¤erence is the e¤ect of round-tripping- domestic investment by Chinese rms disguised
as FDI in order to gain a tax advantage. A look at the foreign investment position from the
US however recorded the following di¤erence: US cumulative investments in China and India
(historical price) stand at $16.9B and $8.5B respectively. For manufacturing, the respective
gures are $8.8B and $2.4B (Bureau of Economic Analysis). While round-trippingmay well
account for some of the di¤erence between the FDI that China and India have received, it
is clear that China continues to receive signcantly more bona de FDI than India. Despite
recent headline-grabbing growth rates from India, the FDI gap with China has not closed,
although this might change in the near future.
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paradox for China. Is it therefore correct to conclude that China somehow has
better fundamentals - institutions, technology, human capital, and/or less cap-
ital market imperfections? Given the fact that India is a stable parliamentary
democracy, has a deeply entrenched English legal system with the associated
emphasis on property rights, and a largely free press, it is di¢ cult to turn the
argument around and conclude that China has better institutions or better
functioning markets that result in the huge di¤erence in observed investment
ows4. The puzzle is therefore not only why relatively little capital has owed
to the developing economies but also the distribution of the ow of capital to
these economies.
New Economic Geography The objective of this paper is to synthe-
size the New Economic Geography (NEG) understanding of the location of
industries with more recent rm-heterogeneity trade models, in order to bring
about a new understanding to an old puzzle as well as answer some of these
new questions posed.
NEG researchers have had more than a decade of success in demonstrat-
ing how industrial agglomeration can result. These models demonstrate how
a symmetric fall in trade costs can result in highly asymmetric outcomes
(catastrophic agglomeration) [see Paul Krugman (1991); Venables (1996);
Krugman and Venables (1995)]. An example of the mechanics is that rms
locate where there are workers, and workers locate where there are rms (to
reduce cost of living), giving rise to a feedback e¤ect. These models tend to
be highly intractable as a result. A more tractable model of industrial loca-
tion is the Footloose Capital(FC) model due to Philippe Martin and Carol
Ann Rogers (1995). The key assumption of the model is that only capital is
mobile, while workers and owners of capital are not. Capital income is cost-
lessly repatriated, consumed locally. Since expenditure shares between the
locations remain static regardless of the choice of industrial location, there is
no agglomerative (or feedback) e¤ect in this class of models.
This paper has chosen to adopt the FC assumption as international eco-
nomics continue to be dominated by high capital mobility. In essence, the
model in this paper assumes mobile capital, immobile labour, and rms with
heterogeneous productivity. There are two locations, North and South. Di¤er-
ences between the two regions are characterised not by the aggregate produc-
tion functions, but by di¤erences in the productivity (pareto) distributions of
4The problem with looking at historical data for defaults to explain current allocation,
or predict future capital ows, becomes evident here. Historical data do not account for
regime changes, changes in investor condence and perception about the future. Reinhart
and Rogo¤ (2004) duly note that India has never defaulted while China has defaulted on
two occasions between 1901 and 2002. Yet it is still the case that China has taken the lions
share of FDI.
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rms. The shares of manufacturing rms in each location are then solved for
in the equilibrium by equalising the ex-ante value of entry in both locations.
Several new results emerge from the exercise.
Explaining the Lack of Capital Flow to South Firstly, while neo-
classical models suggest that the productivity di¤erences between North and
South have to be very large to explain the lack of capital ow, this paper shows
that a small improvement in Norths productivity (by changing the mean of
the pareto distribution) can have a dramatic impact on the share of rms,
while keeping the returns to factors equal in both locations. This therefore
provides an alternative resolution to the Lucas paradox. Admittedly, this pa-
per does not explain why the small di¤erence in productivity would arise in
the rst place. This question is better left to development or political-economy
researchers [see James R. Tybout (2000) for a brief discussion].
Resolving The Paradox of Risk The second key result concerns the
e¤ect of risk. James R. Tybout (2000) for example notes that it is common to
see very large plants existing side by side with very small ones in developing
countries, even though there is little evidence to suggest plants in developing
countries are inherently less productive. The author therefore suggests that
this may be a result of uncertainty about policies . . . poor rule of law. The
assumption here is that the South has a riskier productivity draw.
A well known property of the prot function is its convexity. Consider the
example of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preference function.
For whatever the cost of production (inverse of productivity), the rms rev-
enue is bounded from below by zero - that is, revenue is always positive no
matter how high the cost (and price) is. However, there is no upper bound
to revenue. Therefore, a mean-preserving spread of productivity actually in-
creases expected prots because of the very convexity of the prot function5.
If the South were to have greater aggregate productivity risks while keeping
its mean productivity equal to the North, this would imply that expected
prot is higher there, and mobile capital will ow to the South until the
expected return to capital is once again equalised for both locations. This is
the paradox of riskfor it contradicts commonplace intuition that rms shun
locations perceived to have high risks to production. But in principle, the rm
is a risk neutral entity. As long as the rm maximises expected prots, why
does it care about risk?
It turns out that there is a good reason for this if one thinks of risk as
outlined in a rm-specic productive risk in Marc J. Melitz (2003). Each rm
5A mean-preserving spread of expenditure will have no such e¤ect since it will still result in
the same expected prots since the expenditure is homogeneous of degree one in expenditure.
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will have to pay a sunk cost to attempt entry into a market. Upon the payment
of this cost, the rm draws a level of productivity specic to itself, from an
ex-ante distribution. The rm then makes the decision whether to continue
production based on the level of realised productivity. If productivity is high
enough, the rm will pay the xed production cost and produce. Otherwise,
the rm lets bygones be bygonesand exits.
It turns out that in equilibrium, the level of the sunk cost will have an
impact on the location of industries. Suppose one location is riskier than
the other while holding the mean of the productivity distribution constant.
The riskier distribution will have fatter tails. Ceteris paribus, high sunk cost
industries prefer to invest in less risky locations because the higher likelihood
of entry dominates (the probability of a really bad draw is low). On the other
hand, low sunk cost industries invest in higher risk locations (with fatter right
side tails for productivity draws) since the chance of getting a really good
productivity draw dominates. Given a particular sunk cost, a rm therefore
has to balance these two e¤ects. The model can explain why hi-techindustries
- characterised by high sunk costs - cluster in the less risky North while low-
techindustries move to the risky South. Trade liberalisation results in North
and South specialising in di¤erent industries.
2 The Model Setup
2.1 Endowments and Regions
There are two primary factors of production - capital and labour. There are
two regions - North and South. The North has KN units of capital and LN
units of labour while the South has KS and LS , all factors in xed and known
quantities. Capital is completely mobile between regions, and capital returns
can be costlessly remitted to owners for consumption. Workers (who are also
owners of capital) are completely immobile between regions, and their labour
is supplied inelastically to the local market.
2.2 Preferences
There are two types of goods - agriculture (a) and manufacturing (m). The
motivation is similar to most NEG models, with the agriculture sector equal-
ising wages across economies in an equilibrium characterised by incomplete
specialisation and without trade cost in agriculture. The j consumers utility
is given as
uj = c

mjc
1 
aj
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where cmj =
R

 c
 1

i di
 
 1
is the consumption of the 
 set of manufactured
goods,  > 1 >  > 0.
2.3 Technology and Firms
2.3.1 Agriculture
The agricultural sector has a constant returns to scale production function.
For simplicity, units are chosen such that 1 unit of labour produces 1 unit of
output. As per the usual assumption for NEG models, the agricultural good
is costlessly traded between countries. This assumption equalises the price of
the agricultural good and wages across countries.
2.3.2 Manufacturing
The manufacturing sector requires a composite factor production  which is
produced by the primary factors - capital and labour - with a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas production technology
 = AKL1 
where A is the aggregate technology parameter.
There is a large number of rms, each producing one variety. The rms
technology is homothetic and represented by the familiar increasing returns
function
Ci =

f +
qi
'i

P
where f is the xed production cost and q the output. Therefore
h
f + qi'i
i
gives the total input required of the rm in terms of  and C is the total cost
function given P which is the price of the industrial composite. All rms have
the same xed cost but di¤erent levels of productivity '.
Traditionally, the FC model has a disembodied technology - capital in-
puts for xed cost and labour inputs for variable cost. Using a standard FC
model but incorporating rm heterogeneity, Richard E. Baldwin and Toshihiro
Okubo (2005) show how the home market e¤ect can induce more productive
rms to relocate to the larger market. That paper takes the ex-post produc-
tivity distribution of rms as given and ignores the entry or exit decision of
rms. In a subsequent paper, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) introduce the en-
try and exit process. In that paper, the authors again highlight the home
market e¤ect, but further show how instantaneous entry and exit is a perfect
substitute for relocation.
To achieve more analytical tractability, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) make
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some simplifying assumptions. Sunk cost, xed export cost (beachhead cost),
and variable production cost is borne by labour inputs only. Fixed production
cost consists of capital only. The production technology is therefore a non-
homothetic one, much like the standard FC model. In a rm heterogeneity
setup however, there are many types of cost. This paper therefore adopts
a more uniform approach towards the various types of costs by assuming a
homothetic production technology that is more similar to Andrew B. Bernard,
Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott (2007) - known henceforth as BRS
- where all costs require the same composition of inputs. There are several
advantages with this setup.
Firstly, it is more realistic in that all costs will require capital and labour.
The homotheticity of inputs towards manufacturing allows the model to be
solved easily as in Melitz (2003) even in the presence of rm heterogeneity by
making use of the Zero Cuto¤ Protsand Free Entryconditions. Secondly,
symmetric changes in endowments across countries do not have an impact
on rm level aggregates. Changes in endowments only a¤ect the levels of
composite as well as the capital-labour ratio. In a homothetic production
setting, changes in endowments a¤ect only the number of rms, relative returns
of primary factors, and associated welfare, with no additional e¤ect on rm
level aggregates6. The e¤ect of changing endowments proportionately is just
like changing market size.
Finally, though this paper draws inspiration from BRS (2007), there is a
key di¤erence. In BRS (2007) both factors of production - skilled and unskilled
labour - are immobile. In this paper however, one of the factors - capital -
is completely mobile. In essence, the technology function in this paper is a
hybrid, combining elements of various research [Martins and Roger; Melitz;
BRS] to incorporate various useful properties.
2.3.3 Capital Market
This paper abstracts from any capital market imperfections by assuming that
there is a well functioning capital market such that capital is transferred from
owners to rms, and rewards are transferred costlessly back to owners for
consumption.
6Consider the opposite case with a non-homothetic technology, supposing only capital
is used for the sunk cost fe. An increase in capital endowment, relative to labour, will
mean that there will be relatively more resources for sunk cost compared to production. In
equilibrium, it has to be more di¢ cult to gain entry, and cuto¤ productivity has to increase.
In other words, with a non-homothetic technology, changes in endowment will a¤ect rm
level aggregates.
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2.3.4 Normalisation of Prices
The cost of the composite input  - which depends on r and w - will be
also equalised between the two regions given free capital mobility and costless
agriculture trade. Applying cost minimisation, together setting the P as the
numeraire, gives the following equation
P =
w1 r
A
"

1  
1 
+

1  

#
 1 (1)
This equilibrium relationship, in the situation of incomplete specialisation,
allows the interest rate to be expressed in terms of wage rate and parameters
(or vice versa)7.
Furthermore, an implication of both cost minimisation and the equalisation
of factor prices is that the rental-wage ratio can be expressed as
r
w
=


1  

LM
KN +KS
(2)
where LM is the total labour used in manufacturing8. Equation (2) allows
r to be expressed as a function of w and parameters. Substituting this into
equation (1), one can express the labour to capital ratio in manufacturing as
a function of w only.
2.3.5 Pareto Productivity Distributions
All manufacturing rms face an ex-ante distribution of productivity in each
location. This paper assumes pareto distributions for productivities in both
North and South [Elhanan Helpman, Melitz and Stephen R. Yeaple (2005);
BRS (2007); Baldwin and Okubo (2006)]9. The parameters for the North are
'N and kN , where 'N species the minimum support and kN the shape of
7The advantage of choosing P as the numeraire (rather than wages) is that it allows all
equilibrium conditions for the manufacturing rms to be written in terms of  only, without
having to deal with the cost minimising price function of .
8 In an interior equilibrium, since r and w are common to both economies, they will have
the same labour-capital ratios in the di¤erentiated sectors. Hence r
w
KMN =

1 LMN and
r
w
KMS =

1 LMS where KMN and KMS are the mobile capital deployed to the North
and South respectively (whiole LMN and LMS are the labour employed in manufacturing
respectively). Since all capital sums up to world endowment, r
w
(KN+KS) =

1 LM , where
LM = LMN + LMS .
9The relevant cumulative density, probability density, mean and variance are given as
G(') = 1 

'm
'
k
g(') =
k'km
'k+1
E(') =
k'm
k   1 V ar(') =
'2mk
(k   1)2(k   2)
where k > 2 and 'm > 0. For a pareto distribution, both mean and variance is decreasing
in k.
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the distribution. The corresponding parameters for the South are 'S and kS .
2.3.6 Sunk Cost
Firms trying to enter the manufactured goods market are required to pay a
sunk cost of fe (again in terms of ) to draw the rm specic productivity '.
As capital is completely mobile, a rm can choose to pay this cost either in
the North or in the South, upon which its productivity will be drawn from
the respective distribution. The paper assumes that rms are not allowed to
relocate their investment once they have selected on the initial location. The
reason for this assumption is simple. Firm specic productivity is assumed to
be tied to the institutional context in which sunk cost is incurred10.
2.3.7 Trade Cost
Trade in the manufacturing sector is costly. There is a  > 1 iceberg trade cost
for every unit shipped. In addition, exporters will have to incur a beachhead,
or a xed export cost fX in order to export. Both costs are in terms of , paid
in the home country. Selection into the export market will occur if there exist
rms with productivity below ' that nd it protable to operate domestically
(with domestic revenue rD) but not export (thereby foregoing revenue rX).
3 Trade Equilibrium Conditions
As usual, the agriculture sector equalises wages between the two locations
w = pa = p

a = w

where Southern variables are denoted with the asterisk (except for variables
related to productivity ' where locations are denoted with the subscript).
3.1 Export Partitioning
With CES preferences, the optimal pricing of a rm with productivity '1 is
p('1) =

 1
1
'1
, and the revenue given as r('1) =
p('1)
1 
P 1  E, where E is the
aggregate expenditure and P is the CES price aggregate. The ratio of revenues
between two rms with productivities '1 and '2 can therefore be expressed as
r('1)
r('2)
=

'1
'2
 1
. Furthermore, one can dene a rm with cuto¤ productivity
' as the marginal rm - one that just makes enough operating prots to cover
10 If both locations have the same ex-ante productivity distribution, no rms will relocate
in equilibrium since the cuto¤s are the same. An atomistic rm will have the same expected
prots in both locations. If the productivity distributions are di¤erent, considering the
e¤ects of relocation requires an assumption to be made about whether productivity can be
transferred across locations.
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the xed cost of production f . This rm therefore satises the relationship of
net operating prots equalling the xed cost: 1 r('
) = f . This allows one to
write the revenue of a rm with an average productivity of ~' (to be dened
later) as a function of the cuto¤ productivity ' only
r(~') =

~'
'
 1
f
Average prots from domestic sales become
D =

~'
'
 1
f   f =
"
~'
'
 1
  1
#
f
Analogously, prots from exporting become
X =
"
~'X
'X
 1
  1
#
fX
where 'X is the export cuto¤ (greater than '
) because of the exporting
partition condition which is assumed to hold (that is, not all rms export),
and ~'X is the average productivity of exporters.
3.2 Average Prots
Given these standard derivations, the average prots in the North can be
written as
 =
"
~'N
'N
 1
  1
#
f + ~pX
"
~'NX
'NX
 1
  1
#
fX (3)
where 'N is the cuto¤ productivity for entry, ~'N the average productivity of
all Northern rms above the cuto¤, 'NX the cuto¤ productivity into export,
and ~'NX is the average productivity of Northern exporters. Since only those
manufacturers with a productivity draw greater than 'NX can export, the
term ~pX =

'N
'NX
kN
gives the conditional probability of having a high enough
productivity to export, conditional upon entry.
The analogous expression for the South is
 =
"
~'S
'S
 1
  1
#
f + ~pX
"
~'SX
'SX
 1
  1
#
fX (4)
where ~pX =

'S
'SX
kS
is the conditional probability of exporting in the South.
The marginal rms in the North and South, with productivities 'N and
'S , recover only the xed cost of production f in equilibrium. This gives the
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following relationship

   1
1
'N
1   E
P 1 

= f =


   1
1
'S
1   E
P 1 

(5)
These are e¤ectively zero prot conditions that will help pin down the pro-
ductivity cuto¤s in equilibrium.
3.3 Productivities of Northern and Southern Firms
As with the usual derivations in such models, average productivities of North-
ern and Southern rms - ~'N and ~'S - are functions of the respective cuto¤s
only11. The pareto productivity distributions allow the ratios between the
average productivities and their respective cuto¤s to be written as a func-
tion of parameters only

~'N
'N
 1
=

~'NX
'NX
 1
=
h
kN
kN+1 
i
, with analogous
expressions holding for the South.
Together, these properties give the extremely useful result that ~'N'N
= ~'NX'NX
with the pareto productivity distributions. Though exporters have a higher
average productivity, the ratio of average productivity of all producers to
the entry cuto¤ is exactly the same as the ratio of average productivity of
all exporters to the export cuto¤. Plugging these conditions into equations
(3) and (4) greatly simplies these expressions and the characterisation of
equilibrium. Finally, a rm with 'N makes zero prots in the domestic market,
while a rm with 'NX makes zero prots from exporting (with the analogous
relationships holding for the South as well)12.
3.4 Aggregate Productivity and Prices
The aggregate productivity and price level in a location depend not only on
domestic rms, but also on foreign rms selling there. Dene the total number
of varieties in the North by M = n + ~pXn
. This indicates that the number
of varieties in the North is made up of n domestic rms and ~pXn
 of South-
ern rms that are successful in exporting to the North. The corresponding
expression for the South is M = ~pXn+ n.
11These are ~'N =
h
1
1 GN ('N )
R1
'
N
' 1gN (')d'
i 1
 1
and ~'S =h
1
1 GS('S)
R1
'
S
' 1gS(')d'
i 1
 1
. With pareto productivity distributions, these can
be further simplied to ~'N =
h
kN
kN+1 
i 1
 1
'N and ~'S =
h
kS
kS+1 
i 1
 1
'S .
12When the countries are symmetric, the respective export cuto¤s are a function of produc-
tion cuto¤s and parameters only, with 'NX = '

N

fX
f
 1
 1
and 'SX = '

S

fX
f
 1
 1
.
When the countries are not symmetric, one can show that 'NX = 

fX
f
 1
 1
'S and
'SX = 

fX
f
 1
 1
'N [see Svetlana Demidova (2006)]
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The average productivity of the North becomes the weighted average of
productivities of Northern rms and Southern exporters
'^ =

1
M
 
n~' 1N + ~p

Xn
~' 1SX
 1 1
(6)
where  = 1  is the freedom of trade index. The corresponding equation
for the South can be written as
'^ =

1
M
 
~pXn~'
 1
NX + n
~' 1S
 1 1
(7)
With these denitions of productivities, the aggregate price levels in the North
and South are given as
P =M
1
1 

   1
1
'^
P  =M
1
1 

   1
1
'^
(8)
This completes the characterisation of the aggregate price levels for both loca-
tions. The aggregate prices P and P  in equation (8) can also be substituted
into the marginal rm conditions in equation (5), allowing the zero prot
conditions to be expressed as function of rm mass and productivity cuto¤s
only.
3.5 Equalisation of Expected Values of Entry in North and
South
Free entry ensures that the ex-ante value of entry must be equal for both
locations if there is to be an interior solution (with manufacturing rms in
both locations) The condition for an interior equilibrium can be written as
~pN = ~p
S = fe, where ~p = 1 GN ('N ) =

'N
'N
kN
and ~p = 1 GS('S) =
'S
'S
kS
are the entry probabilities of the North and South respectively13.
With the appropriate substitutions, this expression can be explicitly written
as
~p

   1
kS + 1  

(f + ~pXfX) = fe = ~p

   1
kN + 1  

(f + ~pXfX) (9)
where ~pX and ~pX are the conditional probabilities of exporting.
13 If manufacturing concentrates completely in one location, one of these equalities will not
hold. Expected prots in one location do not cover the sunk cost fe in equilibrium and no
manufacturing rms locate there. This can be used to pin down the break/sustain point.
11
3.6 Market Clearing
There are in equilibrium n successful entrants in the North and n in the
South. But due to the cuto¤s, the number of rms that attempt entry has
to be higher. The total number of rms that attempt entry, including those
below the cuto¤s, is
ne =
n
~p
ne =
n
~p
where ne and ne are the total number of entry attempts in the North and
South respectively.
The composite input  is used for four purposes - sunk cost (fe), xed pro-
duction cost (f), marginal production cost, and export costs (this is incurred
by exporters only). The key to note here is that even unsuccessful entrants will
use up industrial inputs. The marginal cost for each rm is 1' , a rm-specic
variable. The aggregate variable production cost in the North can be written
as n

kN
kN+1 

(   1)f [see Appendix]. Aggregate composite input used in
the North becomes
 = n

f +

kN
kN + 1  

(   1)f + fe
~p
+ ~pX

fX +

kN
kN + 1  

(   1)fX

(10)
Multiplied by the number of rms, the rst term within the brackets on the
right hand side is the total xed production cost. The second term on the
right (again multiplied by the number of rms n) is the aggregate variable
cost of all rms. The third term (multiplied by the number of rms) is the
total sunk cost incurred, including that of the unsuccessful rms. Finally,
the terms inside the square brackets (multiplied by the number of rms) are
the total beachhead and exporting production costs, which are incurred by
exporters only. An analogous term can be written for the South
 = n

f +

kS
kS + 1  

(   1)f + fe
~p
+ ~pX

fX +

kS
kS + 1  

(   1)fX

(11)
The above two expressions therefore give the quantity of the composite input
 demanded in the North and South respectively.
Due to the cost minimisation property, the derived demand for capital
is K = 1A
 
w
r
1   
1 
1 
. By substituting the demands of  into the
appropriate conditional demands, one can derive the demands of the primary
factors capital and labour. Since the total demand of capital in the world must
be equal to the endowment, the capital clearing condition can be written as
KW =
1
A
w
r
1  
1  
1 
(+ ) (12)
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Equation (12) converts the industrial inputs into capital by substituting  in
equations (10) and (11) into the appropriate cost-minimising function. This
is the rst market clearing equation.
Similarly, since the conditional demand for labour (for manufacturing)
can be written as L = 1A
 
r
w
  1 


, the total labour requirement for
manufacturing becomes
LM =
1
A
 r
w
1  


(+ ) (13)
As labour is also used for agriculture, the total manufacturing labour does
not equal to the total labour endowment. Instead, the amount of labour
available for agriculture is whatever labour not used in manufacturing. This
has to be equal to the real demand for agricultural goods (nominal expenditure
divided by the price of agriculture goods, which is w), giving the agricultural
market (or labour market) clearing condition
LW   LM = (1  )

E + E
w

(14)
Substituting equation (13) into (14) then provides the second market clearing
condition. With CES preferences, the manufacturing goods market clears since
the expenditure on each rm is equal to its revenue. With Walrass Law, the
agriculture market also clears.
3.7 Aggregate Expenditure
As owners of capital are immobile, all capital returns are remitted to the
owners and consumed locally. The aggregate expenditures for the North and
South are simply their respective factor endowments multiplied by the rental
and wage rates, which are the same across countries in the incomplete special-
isation equilibrium
E = rKN + wLN E
 = rKS + wLS
3.8 Equilibrium Solution
The endogenous variables for equilibrium are {w;'N ; '

S ; n; n
} - although
the interest rate is endogenous, it can be recovered by equation (1). For the
ve endogenous variables, the equilibrium is pinned down (after appropriate
substitutions) by (i) two ex-ante free entry conditions in equation (9); (ii)
zero prot condition in equation (5); and two market clearing conditions in
equation (12) and (14).
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3.8.1 Solving for Global Manufacturing Labour
From equation (14), the global production of agriculture is
LW   LM = (1  )

E + E
w

= (1  )

r KW + wLW
w

= (1  )
h r
w
KW + LW
i
The second equality makes use of the fact that the global expenditure is a
function of wage-rental and global endowments E +E = r KW +wLW . Sub-
stituting the rental-wage ratio from equation (2) then allows the worlds labour
employed in manufacturing to be expressed as a function of endowments and
parameters only
LM =

(1  )
1  

LW (15)
Note that  (which is the share of manufacturing in consumption) has to be
less than 1 for
h
(1 )
1 
i
, the share of global labour in manufacturing, to also
be less than 1.
3.8.2 Solving for Rental-Wage Ratio
Substituting equation (15) back to equation (2) then allows the rental-wage
ratio to be expressed as a function of parameters only
r
w
=


1  
 LW
KW
(16)
Note that the rental-wage ratio is also una¤ected by any rm level variables.
It depends on the endowments ratio and parameters only.
3.8.3 Solving for Total Composite Resource
Equation (13) gives the relationship between LM and the composite resource
+ 
LM =
1
A
 r
w
1  


(+ )
Substituting equations (15) and (16) into the above will give
+  = A(1  )1 


1  
1 
L1 W K

W (17)
The total composite resource available to the manufacturing sector is an in-
creasing function of endowments, aggregate technology A, and share of manu-
facturing consumption  (because this reduces the amount of labour required
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for agriculture). This therefore pins down the total composite factor supply
in terms of endowments and parameters only.
4 When the North Is More Productive
From the free entry conditions in equation (9),
~p

   1
kN + 1  

(f + ~pXfX) = ~p


   1
kS + 1  

(f + ~pXfX)
Since k = kN = kS , this condition becomes
~p (f + ~pXfX) = ~p
 (f + ~pXfX)
Writing this equation more explicitly
'N
'N
k "
f +

'N
'NX
k
fX
#
=

'S
'S
k "
f +

'S
'SX
k
fX
#
From here, the paper states a few simplifying relationships. First, 'N =
 'S where  > 1 represents the rightward shift of Norths support for the pro-
ductivity distribution. Second, one can make use of the following relationships
'NX = 

fX
f
 1
 1
'S and '

SX = 

fX
f
 1
 1
'N when solving for cuto¤s for
asymmetric countries where Z = 

fX
f
 1
 1
[see Demidova (2006)]. Third, let
k = fXf be the ratio of the two xed cost. Using these simple relationships,
the above equation can be further simplied to
 
'N
k fZk'kS + 'kN fX
Zk'kS

=

1
'S
k fZk'kN + 'kS fX
Zk'kN

After cancellations of terms, one can simplify this to
 k

Zk'kS + '
k
N 
k

= Zk'kN + '
k
S 
k
By grouping the terms, one can express one cuto¤ as a function of another
'N =
"
k    kZk
 kk   Zk
#
'S = '

S (18)
where  =
h
k  kZk
 kk Zk
i
> 1 is simply a function of parameters only.
15
4.1 Solving for Cuto¤s
This subsection solves for Souths productivity cuto¤ using the free entry
condition
fe = ~p


   1
kS + 1  

(f + ~pXfX)
Since the probability of entry is given as ~p =

'S
'S
k
and the conditional
probability of export ~pX =

'S
'SX
k
=

'S
Z'N
k
, the above equation becomes
fe =

'S
'S
k     1
k + 1  
"
f +

1

k
fX
#
(19)
This gives the analytical closed-form solution to Souths cuto¤'S . The North-
ern cuto¤ can be derived from equation (18). With these productivity cuto¤s,
the export cuto¤s can also be derived. The break point - where all rms locate
in the North - is characterised in the Appendix.
4.2 Aggregate and Firm-Level Variables
In characterising this equilibrium, a few facts stand out. Firstly, the equilib-
rium rental-wage ratio in equation (16) is una¤ected by any rm level vari-
ables. The amount of industrial resources  +  in equation (17) available
for the di¤erentiated sector is also independent of rm level variables. These
are all functions of endowments and other parameters only. As mentioned
before, symmetric changes in endowments (relative or absolute), therefore do
not have any impact on rm level variables. Secondly, rm level productivity
cuto¤s are solved through the free entry conditions in equation (9), and are
also completely independent from interest or wage rates. The only interaction
between rm-level and aggregate variables is how the size of resources + 
a¤ect the number of rms in equilibrium.
4.3 A Numerical Example
This subsection provides a simple numerical example to illustrate the equi-
librium characterised14. This paper does not make any empirical estimates
on any parameters. Instead, parameters on preferences and pareto distribu-
tion are taken from existing research. The choice of endowment is arbitrary.
However, the same level of endowment is chosen for the North and South in
14Numerical solutions are obtained through MATLAB. An initial estimate is provided for
all the variables. The endogenous variables are then solved through the equilibrium condi-
tions, and incremental updates in each round are carried out by taking the weighted average
between the oldand newsolutions, until there are no further changes (convergence). The
solution method is similar to Krugman (1991) and BRS (2007). I am grateful to Stephen
Redding for sharing the MATLAB codes.
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order not to introduce the home market e¤ect that would otherwise be evi-
dent in an Economic Geography model. This assumption will be relaxed later
to bring out the home market e¤ect. The list of parameters is provided in
Appendix. The set of cost parameters is ff; fe; fX ; g. These parameters will
also be varied in various numerical solutions to highlight the e¤ects of changes
in them.
In the rst set of numerical solutions, North and South have the same
distribution shape kN = kS = 3:6. However, North is given a better pro-
ductivity compared to the baseline scenario, 'N = 0:205 > 'S = 0:2. This
shifts the Norths distribution rightwards (rst degree stochastic dominance).
The North is 2.5 per cent more productive than the South on the basis of the
unconditional mean.
Even though North and South have the same level of expenditure (given the
same level of endowment), the slight perturbation of the pareto distributions
results in dramatic di¤erences in industry location. The equilibrium e¤ects on
industrial concentration are presented in Table 1 for three di¤erent levels of
trade cost (the Tomahawk diagram will be presented in a later section).
Table 1: Share of Firms and Capital in More Productive North
f = 10 fe = 10 fX = 10  = 1:40  = 1:30  = 1:20
Share of Firms 0.535 0.566 0.661
Share of Capital 0.550 0.590 0.700
The rm-level variables with a relatively low level of trade cost  = 1:10
are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Equilibrium Variables with More Productive North
For  = 1:20 North South
Cuto¤ Productivity 0.3358 0.3104
Probability of Successful Entry 0.1693 0.2054
Average FirmsProductivity, on entry 0.5745 0.5312
Aggregate Price Levels 0.1331 0.1440
The results show that a reasonably small perturbation in the productivity
distribution in the North can have a signicant impact on the location of
rms and capital. A 2.5 per cent increase in the unconditional mean of the
productivity distribution creates a high concentration of industrial activity in
the North at a intermediate-low level of trade cost of  = 1:20 (Table 1). The
intuition becomes clear in Table 2. The better productivity distribution in
the North means that rms there are more productive and protable. More
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rms need to move there until the e¤ects of local market competition cancel
out any productivity advantages.
Another striking feature of this equilibrium is that in an interior equilib-
rium r and w are in fact the same in both locations, despite a higher level
of capital in the North. The South continues to have a lower aggregate KL
ratio compared to the North, but the marginal returns to capital is the same
in both North and South. The Lucas paradox disappears. The superiority
of the North is not in the aggregate production function, but is due to an
improvement in rm-specic productivity draws.
Thirdly, the fall in trade cost will accentuate the advantages of locating in
the North even though the levels of expenditure are the same in each location.
In the traditional FC model, if the expenditures of both locations are the same,
location of rms will be symmetric at all positive levels of trade cost. The
concentration of industry depends on the home market e¤ect. In other words,
trade cost is completely impotentin creating asymmetric concentration when
the two markets are of equal size.
This is however not the case here. Expenditure is the same in both lo-
cations, but the fall in trade cost brings about an increasing concentration
of industry to the North. The key to understanding this lies in the inspec-
tion of equations (6) and (7). Because the North has a superior productivity
distribution, its rms are more productive in equilibrium. In autarky, North
and Souths CES price indices only reect the productivities of their domestic
rms.
Therefore, with the opening to trade and the fall in trade cost, the increase
in  creates a greater increase in weighted average productivity in the South '^
compared with '^. Competitive pressure intensies more quickly in the South
with a fall in trade cost, thereby accentuating the advantages of locating in the
North. Conversely, Northern rms are less a¤ected by the e¤ects of increased
competition as a result of freer trade since they are more productive than their
Southern counterparts.
5 The Impact of Risk
In the previous sub-section, the North is more attractive due to its better pro-
ductivity distribution. However, suppose the South is not less productive but
riskier. How will this change the distribution of capital and rms? It is impor-
tant that the impact of risk is clearly understood since one of the competing
hypotheses on why relatively little capital ows to the South is the inherent
riskiness in investing there (expropriation risk, political risk etc). In this set
of numerical solutions, it is precisely this e¤ect that is being modelled by al-
lowing the two productivity distributions to have the same mean productivity
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but greater dispersion in the South.
In this set of numerical solutions, the North has the following minimum
support 'N = 0:205 > 'S = 0:2. Moreover, the shape of the Norths dis-
tribution is tighter with kN = 3:8 > kS = 3:6. The result of this is that
the unconditional productivity means in both locations are the same with
cN = cS = 0:277. However, the variance in the North is 16 per cent smaller
than the South. The set of parameters in fact creates a mean preserving
spreadof the productivity distribution in the South. The South is not less
productive on average, but has higher risk as characterised by the higher vari-
ance. The numerical solution to the equilibrium rm shares, with a moderate
level of trade cost  = 1:2 and di¤erent levels of sunk cost fe, are presented in
Table 3.
Table 3: Share of Firms and Capital in Less Risky North with Di¤erent Sunk
Cost
 = 1:30 fe = 10 fX = 10 fe = 5 fe = 10 fe = 30
Share of Firms 0.288 0.335 0.396
Share of Capital 0.196 0.244 0.309
The rm-level variables with  = 1:20 and fe = 20 are presented in Table
4.
Table 4: Equilibrium Variables with Riskier South
For  = 1:30 and fe = 30 North South
Cuto¤ Productivity 0.2121 0.2370
Probability of Successful Entry 0.8629 0.5422
Average FirmsProductivity, upon entry 0.3416 0.4057
Aggregate Price Levels 0.2108 0.1886
The results of this sub-section show the e¤ects of greater variance in the
productivity distribution. There is a tendency for industrial concentration in
the South. The higher variance in the South implies that there is a fatter right
side tail for the pareto distribution. As can be seen from Table 4, the e¤ect of
this is that although the probability of entry is lower in the South, the average
productivity upon successful entry is in fact higher in the South due to the
fatter right tail.
What is the economic intuition here? After a rm invests in the sunk cost
and discovers its productivity, it can decide whether to incur the xed produc-
tion cost f . Incurring the sunk cost creates an option whether to produce, as
a rm has a choice of whether to carry out production. At low values of the
sunk cost, the South is more attractive since it o¤ers a greater probability of
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a high productivity draw (and higher average productivity). At higher values
of the sunk cost however, this option e¤ectively becomes more expensive and
reduces the attraction of the South.
To understand the impact that cuto¤s have on distribution of capital, it
is useful to rst think of ex-ante entry conditions without cuto¤s. Suppose a
rm has to make a decision to enter either the North or South market in one
stage. In other words, there is no separation of fe and f - a rm discovers
its productivity and can begin production without any further investment.
Further suppose that the South has a higher productivity spread. With the
CES demand, the revenue function is always bounded from below by zero
but has no upper bound. A higher productivity spread in the South in fact
increases the ex-ante prots, thereby drawing more rms there until any ex-
ante di¤erence is equalised. This is the e¤ect seen in Figure 1, where the
same CES revenue function is superimposed on the probability densities of
the North and Souths productivity distribution.
Figure 1: E¤ects on Expected Revenue with Di¤erent North-South Produc-
tivity Distributions
P.d.f
High productivity spread South
Productivity spread North
Revenue functionSouth North
The narrow right side tail of the North means that it is giving up the po-
tential for high productivity draws and high prots. Because of the convexity
of the revenue function, a rm in the North will have lower expected prots,
ceteris paribus. If North and South have similar expenditures, more rms will
have to locate to the South until prots are equalised.
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However, given a two stage entry game (fe to discover productivity and f
to produce), the riskier location can imply a smaller probability of entry. With
the cuto¤productivity in a two stage entry decision, revenue functions are now
truncated left of the cuto¤ (see Figure 2). Given that the two locations have
di¤erent productive distributions, the e¤ect is asymmetric.
Figure 2: E¤ects of Cuto¤s on Expected Revenue (Truncation)
P.d.f
High productivity spread South
Productivity spread North
Revenue functionSouth North
The revenue function is truncated (falls to zero) left of the respective cut-
o¤s. The probability of successful entry can become higher in the North,
dominating any foregone probability of an high probability draw in the South.
If that happens, more rms will have to locate to the North. It is also possible
that potential for high productivity draws in the South to dominate the higher
entry probability in the South, and more rms locate to the South in that case.
Expected prots are determined by two components - rstly the probability
of successful entry and secondly, the expected productivity and protability
post-entry. It is the balance of these two margins that changes the relative
attractiveness of each location.
Consider then the e¤ect of the sunk cost fe. A higher fe will always shift
the cuto¤s to the left while a lower fe shifts cuto¤ rightwards. As fe increases
and cuto¤s shift leftwards, the probability of successful entry always rises faster
in the North since it has a narrower productivity distribution. Conversely as
fe falls, Norths entry probability falls faster than the Souths. The level of
fe therefore changes the balance of the two margins a¤ecting a rms decision
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on where to locate. Ignoring the e¤ect of market size for the moment and
keeping expenditures the same in both locations, increasing fe will increase
the expected prots of North and result in more rms locating there, and vice
versa [see Appendix].
6 Extension to Multi-Industry and Larger North
In this section, the paper further generalises the results to an economy with
more than one di¤erentiated industry. As before, there are two regions North
and South - where both have the same mean productivity, but South is riskier.
The productivity distributions are the same as the previous section15. What
is di¤erent here is that there are two di¤erentiated sectors, A and B. The
consumption shares are identical at  = 0:15 (this is kept small so that the
agriculture sector continues to operate in both locations). There are no inter-
industry linkages. Furthermore, the North is given an endowment advantage
- its capital and labour endowment are 20 per cent more than the South -
roughly in line with the idea that developed markets are bigger in size. The
paper then shows using numerical solutions how market size can interact with
the level of sunk costs to result in di¤erent types of specialisation as trade
becomes freer.
The two di¤erentiated sectors have exactly the same industrial structure
except for one di¤erence. Industry A is a high-tech industry with a sunk
cost of fe(A) = 30, while industry B is a low-tech industry with a sunk
cost of fe(B) = 1: The two industries have exactly the same cost structure
otherwise with f = 10 and fX = 10: They also have the same iceberg trade
cost. These assumptions are not meant to be realistic. For example, industries
with lower sunk cost (low-tech) tend to have higher elasticity of substitution.
The assumptions are kept as simple as possible here, only for the purpose of
illustrating how two industries with di¤erent fe can end up concentrating at
di¤erent locations with di¤erent ex-ante productivity distributions.
6.1 Tomahawk Diagram
The paper has thus far not presented any Tomahawk diagrams since all intu-
ition will be captured in this section. In the diagram, the level of trade cost
falls from the left to the right in the X-axis ( increases from 0 to 1). The
Y-axis are the shares of industries located in the North16. The Tomahawk
15Where 'N = 0:2077 > 'S = 0:2 and kN = 4 > kS = 3:6.
16For industry A, Norths share is dened as nA
nA+n

A
where nA and nA are the number
of rms in equilibrium (for zero prots) for the North and South respectively. Similarly for
industry B, Norths share is dened as nB
nB+n

B
.
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Figure 3: Tomahawk Diagram with Industries of Two Di¤erent Sunk Costs
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diagram for two industries is presented in Figure 317.
As trade becomes freer (from left to right of the diagram), the breakpoints
are reached18. At BA the break point of industry A, all rms in this industry
are located in the North. At BB the break point of industry B, all rms in
the industry are located in the South. Again, it is important to emphasize
here that North and South will have the same expenditures for each industry.
The implication from the analysis is that as trade becomes freer, industries
with low sunk costs will migrate to the South while industries with high sunk
costs will migrate to the North. The di¤erent proles of the productivity
distributions results in di¤erent types of specialisation.
7 Conclusion
By synthesising a variant of a New Economic Geography model with recent
research into the e¤ects of trade equilibrium under rm heterogeneity, this
paper shows that it is possible to rationalise the highly asymmetric allocation
of capital between North and South without stipulating large di¤erences in
productivity between the two locations.
17Note that the shares under autarky are not symmetric since North and South do not
have the same productivity distribution.
18The break and sustained point are the same for a FC model.
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Introducing rm heterogeneity allows the di¤erences between North and
South to be modelled by way of rm-level di¤erences rather than through the
aggregate production function. With a slight improvement in the Norths pro-
ductivity distribution (rst degree stochastic dominance), this paper demon-
strates that it is possible to explain the high concentration of rms (and cap-
ital) to the North, even though returns to factors of production and expen-
ditures are completely identical between the two regions. The Lucas paradox
disappears as a result.
The second key result of the paper demonstrates how the presence of sunk
costs in a two-stage entry process can resolve the paradox of risk. Hi-tech
or high sunk cost industries tend to locate in the less risky North because it
o¤ers them a greater probability of successful entry relative to the South. For
low-techindustries with low sunk costs, the North is less attractive since the
increase in the probability of entry is o¤set by the potential of higher post-entry
productivity in the South. Capital ows in both directions can be rationalised
depending on the level of sunk costs. In a setup with two di¤erentiated sectors,
it is possible to show how the high sunk cost industry concentrates in the North
and the low sunk cost industry concentrates in the South as trade becomes
freer. This result is easily generalised to a multi-industry framework, where the
less risky North enjoys a comparative advantage in high sunk cost industries
while the South has a comparative advantage in low sunk cost ones. Greater
trade liberalisation will lead to both regions specialising in a di¤erent set of
industries.
The paper also shows how the level of capital ows also depend crucially
on the level of trade costs. If trade costs are high, capital will to a large
extent be distributed according to expenditure shares. With low trade costs,
low-tech industries will locate in the South. This can then explain some
stylised di¤erences in the ow of capital to di¤erent developing economies.
Developing countries with lower trade restrictions will receive more capital
particularly from low-techindustries.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Calibration of Numerical Simulation
Parameter values are referenced to various research where possible. The list
of parameters is given in the table below.
Table 5: Parameters and References
Parameters Value Remarks
Preferences
σ 3.8 Referenced to Bernard et al (2003), Ghironi andMelitz (2004) and BRS (2007) estimate of 3.8.
μ 0.5
Arbitrary, no effect on firm aggregates or distribution
of firms between the locations, so long as it is small
enough such that agriculture continues to exist in both
economies.
Endowment
KN
LN
Ks
Ls
Pareto Distribution
0.2
The baseline support is referenced to BRS (2007).
However, in the various sets of simulations, the
support is varied.
k 3.6
The baseline shape is referenced to BRS (2007).
However, in the various sets of simulations, the shape
is varied.
Technology
A 1 Aggregate productivity is normalised to unity forconvenience.
α 0.3
This is the capital share in the production of the
composite input. Its effect is only on the wage-rental
ratio, and has no effect on distribution of firms.
         1,000,000
Endowments are kept large relative to the fixed cost
in order to have an arbitrarily large number of firms
in equilibrium. Endowments are symmetric between
North and South except for one set of solutions where
the home market effect is modelled by increasing
North's endowment by 20 per cent.
8.1.1 Deriving Total Resource Cost
This subsection proceeds to solve for the total variable production cost in
order to pin down the input requirements for the manufacturing sector [see
equations (10) and (11)].
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Consider a standard total variable production cost (TC) function. This
is the integration of the resources used by each rm q(')' (marginal cost
1
'
multiplied by quantity q(')) over the entire distribution of active rms above
the cuto¤ '
TC =
Z 1
'
n
q(')
'
g(')
1 G(')d' = nq(~')
Z 1
'
1
'

'
~'
 g(')
1 G(')d'
The second equality makes use of the property that q(') = q(~')

'
~'

. With
the pareto distribution and the denition of q('), the above equation can then
be simplied to
TC = nq(~')
k'k
~'
Z 1
'
' k 2d' = n

k
k + 1  

q(')
'
Total production cost is a n
h
k
k+1 
i
factor of the variable production cost of
the marginal rm q('
)
' .
Consider q('
)
' . Multiplying the numerator and denominator by p('
) will
give q('
)
' =
p(')q(')
p(')' =
r(')
p(')' . Since the marginal rms revenue r('
)
must cover f in equilibrium, and its optimal price is p(') =


 1

1
' , it is
possible to simplify the equation further to q('
)
' = (   1)f . This allows the
total cost equation to be written as
TC = n

k
k + 1  

(   1)f (B1)
Similarly, the total cost to the exporters can be written as
TCX = ~pX :n

k
k + 1  

(   1)fX
These expressions are then used in equations (10) and (11).
8.2 Characterising the Break Point
In FC models, the break points and sustain points are the same since there are
no agglomeration e¤ects - whether the initial condition is one of symmetry or
asymmetry does not change the outcome. One can begin to solve for the break
point by using equation (5). By writing out the aggregate price aggregates
explicitly
' 1N
n~' 1N + ~p

Xn
~' 1SX
=
' 1S
~pXn~'
 1
NX + n
~' 1S
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Dividing the numerator and denominator of the LHS by ' 1N and the right
hand side by ' 1S , one can further simplify the equation to
1
n+ ~pXnZ 1
=
1
~pXnZ 1 + n
or
~pXnZ
 1 + n = n+ ~pXn
Z 1
This equation gives the relationship between n and n. When all rms are
concentrated in the North, n = 0. Hence
~pXZ
 1 = 1
Recall that ~pX =

'N
'NX
k
=

'N
Z'S
k
=
 

Z
k giving
"
 kk
k
 1   
k
k
 1    k
#

1
k = 
1
 1 (20)
which provides the implicit solution to the break point - dened as the smallest
level of  that satisfy the above equation. For simplicity, one can assume
fX = f [such as in Falvey, Greenaway and Yu (2006)] or  = 1. The above
equation reduces to
 kk   1 = 

k    k

The bigger advantage the North is given (higher  ), the higher the  that can
satisfy this condition.
8.2.1 Equilibrium Conditions with Mean Preserving Spread for
South
In principle, one can solve for the full equilibrium, including the break/sustain
point, in the same manner as when the North is given a productivity advan-
tage. However, because the Souths productivity distribution no longer has
the same shape as the North kN 6= kS , it is also not possible for terms to
cancel out to arrive at the simple relationship, making it di¢ cult to generalise
the marginal rm condition. Instead, this subsection proceeds to provide some
comparative static analytical results, while the numerical results are presented
in the main text.
If the North has a higher support but a narrow distribution such that the
unconditional means are the same, the equilibrium can be depicted by Figure
4.
In the case of low fe, the average productivity of Southern rms is higher
than the North since the cuto¤ is higher there ('S > '

N ) and that the prob-
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Figure 4: E¤ects of Mean-Preserving Spread of Productivity Distribution
High
Low
ability mass right of 'S is thicker [see Figure 4]. With low fe, more rms will
have to locate in the South to equalise ex-ante prots between the two loca-
tions. Conversely if fe is high enough, Souths cuto¤ 'S will be low enough
relative to 'N such that even the fatter tails cannot compensate. In that case,
more rms will locate to the North.
E¤ects of Increasing Sunk Cost Ignoring the di¤erences between
North and South for the moment. Consider only the marginal impact of an
increase in the sunk cost fe. From the ex-ante free entry condition
'
'
k     1
k + 1  

ff + ~pXfXg = fe
The mean of a pareto distribution is given as c = k'k 1 . To keep the mean
constant at c while allowing k to vary, the minimum support has to be di¤erent.
The minimum support can be written as
' =
c(k   1)
k
This can be substituted into the previous equation to give
' k

c(k   1)
k
k     1
k + 1  

(f + ~pXfX) = fe (B4)
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Partially di¤erentiating ' with respect to fe gives
@'
@fe
=
 'k+1
k
h
c(k 1)
k
ik 
 1
k+1 

(f + ~pXfX)
=
 '
k' k
h
c(k 1)
k
ik 
 1
k+1 

(f + ~pXfX)
(B5)
In equilibrium, equation (B4) will always hold (envelope condition). This
allows equation (B5) to be simplied to
@'
@fe
=
 '
kfe
(B6)
This result shows that an increase in fe always reduces the cuto¤s ' - this is
a standard result. But what are the second order e¤ects when one specically
considers the pareto distribution? Equation (B6) shows that @'

@fe
is more neg-
ative at lower level of k (higher variance). The cuto¤ therefore falls relatively
more quickly for the location with the lower k.
The probability of entry ~p is given as
~p =

c(k   1)
k'
k
The e¤ect of increase in fe on entry probability can be found by the partial
derivative
@~p
@fe
=
@~p
@'
@'
@fe
=

c(k   1)
k
k ' k
fe
(B7)
Since
h
c(k 1)
k
ik
is increasing in k, the increase in fe therefore increases the
probability of entry relatively more quickly for a location with higher k (lower
variance).
Firstly, equation (B6) says that with an increase in fe, the cuto¤ ' falls
relatively faster for a location with higher variance (which is the South in
the context of the discussion). Since average productivity is a function of the
cuto¤ only, this implies that the average productivity falls relatively quickly in
the South as well. Secondly, equation (B7) says that the probability of entry
~p is higher when fe is higher, but this entry probability increases relatively
slower for the location with the higher variance (South). This implies that as
fe rises, the average productivity and probability of entry must rise relatively
less in the location with the higher variance (South). As the sunk cost fe
increases, the ex-ante prot of the South falls relative to the North and more
29
rms will have to locate in the North to restore the equilibrium.
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